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Audit Status

The x0 protocol has not yet undergone a third-party security audit. The protocol is currently on devnet and should not be used with real assets on mainnet until audited.

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Internal Security Review

The codebase has been through an internal security review that identified and addressed findings across multiple severity levels. The following categories of findings have been resolved:

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HIGH Severity — Resolved

IDFindingResolution
HIGH-1Clock manipulation via Clock::get()Added slot-based dual checks with buffers (ROLLING_WINDOW_SLOTS, TIME_CHECK_BUFFER_SLOTS)

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MEDIUM Severity — Resolved

IDFindingResolution
MEDIUM-2Policy update spamAdded POLICY_UPDATE_COOLDOWN_SLOTS (750 slots, ~5 min) rate limiting
MEDIUM-6Arbiter rush resolutionAdded ARBITER_RESOLUTION_DELAY_SLOTS (216,000 slots, ~24h) delay
MEDIUM-8No per-transaction limitAdded maxSingleTransaction field to AgentPolicy
MEDIUM-9Reputation gaming with few transactionsAdded MIN_TRANSACTIONS_FOR_REPUTATION (10) threshold
MEDIUM-10Extra account metas re-initializationAdded ExtraMetasAlreadyInitialized check with authority validation
MEDIUM-12Dust transfer spamAdded MIN_TRANSFER_AMOUNT (100 micro-units) threshold

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LOW Severity — Resolved

IDFindingResolution
LOW-2Unbounded string fields in eventsAdded max length constraints on all string event fields
LOW-3Error code numbering schemeEstablished structured numbering (0x1100–0x1700 ranges)

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Security Checklist

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On-Chain Programs

  • Signer verification — All instructions verify that the expected authority has signed
  • Account ownership checks — All accounts verified against expected owning programs
  • PDA seed validation — All PDAs derived with canonical seeds and bumps
  • Integer overflow protection — All arithmetic uses checked operations or BN
  • Re-initialization prevention — All initialize_* instructions check for existing accounts
  • Access control — Owner-only, buyer-only, seller-only, admin-only checks on all sensitive operations
  • State machine enforcement — Escrow state transitions validated
  • Rate limiting — Policy updates, Blink generation, and daily redemptions are rate-limited
  • Timelock governance — All admin actions go through 48-hour timelock
  • Reserve invariant — Checked on every deposit and redemption
  • Transfer hook enforcement — Guard validates every transfer through the Token-2022 hook
  • ZK proof validation — Proof contexts checked for freshness, ownership, and parameter matching
  • Delegation model — Agent must be delegate; self-delegation prevention; bound account enforcement

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SDK

  • Input validation — All public functions validate parameters before building instructions
  • Error handling — All errors have descriptive messages and error codes
  • Type safety — Full TypeScript type coverage
  • Deterministic key derivation — ElGamal and AES keys derived deterministically from owner keypair + mint
  • WASM proof generation — ZK proofs generated client-side, never exposing secret keys to the network

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Testing

  • 47 native unit tests for x0-zk-proofs (Rust)
  • 14 WASM integration tests for browser/Node.js proof generation
  • SDK-to-core consistency — All discriminators, constants, and type definitions verified against on-chain programs

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Planned Audit Scope

When the protocol proceeds to audit, the following areas are in scope:
  1. x0-guard — Transfer hook logic, spend limit enforcement, whitelist verification, delegation model
  2. x0-escrow — State machine transitions, timeout handling, CPI to reputation
  3. x0-wrapper — Reserve invariant, timelock governance, fee calculation, emergency operations
  4. x0-token — Mint initialization, Token-2022 extension configuration, confidential transfer setup
  5. x0-zk-verifier — Proof verification logic, context freshness, parameter binding
  6. x0-registry — Registration, deregistration, capability metadata
  7. x0-reputation — Score calculation, temporal decay, CPI authorization
  8. x0-zk-proofs — Rust cryptographic primitives, WASM bindings
  9. Cross-program interactions — CPI call graph, account sharing, PDA ownership

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Responsible Disclosure

If you discover a security vulnerability in the x0 protocol, please report it responsibly:
  • Do not open a public GitHub issue
  • Contact the team directly via the channels listed in the project repository
  • Allow reasonable time for the team to investigate and patch before public disclosure
Last modified on February 8, 2026