x0-zk-verifier

Program ID: zQWSrznKgcK8aHA4ry7xbSCdP36FqgUHj766YM3pwre x0-zk-verifier provides on-chain verification of zero-knowledge proofs generated by the x0-zk-proofs WASM library. It validates Groth16 proofs over the Ristretto255 curve for confidential token operations.

Problem Statement

Token-2022’s ConfidentialTransfer extension encrypts balances using Twisted ElGamal, but the protocol still needs to enforce correctness constraints:

Public key validity — The ElGamal public key is correctly derived from a secret scalar
Zero balance — An encrypted balance is actually zero (required for account closure)
Withdraw correctness — A withdrawal amount is valid against the encrypted balance
Transfer correctness — Encrypted sender/receiver ciphertexts are consistent

Each of these requires a zero-knowledge proof that reveals nothing about the underlying amounts.

Proof Types

PubkeyValidityProof

Proves that an ElGamal public key

P

is correctly derived:

P = s \cdot H

where

s

is the secret scalar and

H

is the Ristretto255 generator. Size: 64 bytes

ZeroBalanceProof

Proves that an ElGamal ciphertext encrypts the value 0 without revealing the randomness. Size: 96 bytes

WithdrawProof

Proves that withdrawing amount

a

from encrypted balance

E

is valid — i.e., the remaining balance is non-negative and bounded by

2^{48} - 1

. Size: 160 bytes

TransferProof

Proves that a confidential transfer correctly re-encrypts the amount under the recipient’s public key, and the sender’s remaining balance is non-negative. Size: 288 bytes

Instructions

`verify_pubkey_validity`

Verifies an ElGamal public key validity proof and stores the result in a ProofContext PDA.

verify_pubkey_validity(proof_data: Vec<u8>, elgamal_pubkey: [u8; 32])

`verify_withdraw`

Verifies a withdrawal proof and records the verified amount.

verify_withdraw(
    proof_data: Vec<u8>,
    amount: u64,
    new_decryptable_balance: [u8; 36]
)

`verify_zero_balance`

Verifies that an encrypted balance is zero.

verify_zero_balance(proof_data: Vec<u8>)

`verify_transfer`

Verifies a confidential transfer proof and records the amount and recipient.

verify_transfer(
    proof_data: Vec<u8>,
    amount: u64,
    recipient: Pubkey
)

State Account

ProofContext

Each verified proof creates a ProofContext PDA that serves as an on-chain receipt:

pub struct ProofContext {
    pub version: u8,
    pub proof_type: ProofType,
    pub verified: bool,
    pub owner: Pubkey,
    pub verified_at: i64,
    pub amount: Option<u64>,
    pub recipient: Option<Pubkey>,
    pub elgamal_pubkey: Option<[u8; 32]>,
    pub mint: Pubkey,
    pub token_account: Pubkey,
    pub bump: u8,
}

PDA Seeds: ["proof-context", owner, mint]

Proof Freshness

Proof contexts expire after 300 seconds (PROOF_CONTEXT_FRESHNESS_SECONDS). The is_fresh() method checks:

\text{current\_time} - \text{verified\_at} \leq \Delta_{\text{proof}} = 300\text{s}

This prevents replay attacks — a proof verified 5 minutes ago cannot be used to authorize a new transfer.

Amount Bounds

All proof amounts are bounded by:

0 \leq a \leq 2^{48} - 1 = 281{,}474{,}976{,}710{,}655

This constraint comes from the Token-2022 ConfidentialTransfer extension’s use of 48-bit range proofs.

Verification Flow

Client                     x0-zk-proofs (WASM)         Solana
  │                              │                        │
  │── generate_withdraw_proof ──▶│                        │
  │◀── { proofData, newBal } ───│                        │
  │                              │                        │
  │── verify_withdraw(proof) ────────────────────────────▶│
  │                              │         x0-zk-verifier │
  │                              │    ┌── verify proof ───┤
  │                              │    │   store context   │
  │◀──────────── tx signature ───────────────────────────│
  │                              │                        │
  │── withdraw(amount) ─────────────────────────────────▶│
  │                              │         x0-token       │
  │                              │    ┌── check context ──┤
  │                              │    │   is_fresh()?     │
  │                              │    │   execute         │
  │◀──────────── confirmed ──────────────────────────────│

Error Codes

Code	Name	Description
`0x1700`	`ProofVerificationFailed`	ZK proof did not verify
`0x1701`	`InvalidProofData`	Proof data format invalid
`0x1703`	`InvalidProofType`	Unknown proof type
`0x1704`	`ProofExpired`	Proof context older than 300s
`0x1710`	`AmountTooLarge`	Amount exceeds $2^{48} - 1$
`0x1711`	`InvalidElGamalPubkey`	ElGamal public key invalid
`0x1713`	`ProofSizeMismatch`	Proof data wrong length
`0x1720`	`ArithmeticOverflow`	Integer overflow in verification

Overview

Core Programs

Zero-Knowledge

Application Layer

Reference

Problem Statement

Proof Types

PubkeyValidityProof

ZeroBalanceProof

WithdrawProof

TransferProof

Instructions

`verify_pubkey_validity`

`verify_withdraw`

`verify_zero_balance`

`verify_transfer`

State Account

ProofContext

Proof Freshness

Amount Bounds

Verification Flow

Error Codes

​Problem Statement

​Proof Types

​PubkeyValidityProof

​ZeroBalanceProof

​WithdrawProof

​TransferProof

​Instructions

​verify_pubkey_validity

​verify_withdraw

​verify_zero_balance

​verify_transfer

​State Account

​ProofContext

​Proof Freshness

​Amount Bounds

​Verification Flow

​Error Codes

Problem Statement

Proof Types

PubkeyValidityProof

ZeroBalanceProof

WithdrawProof

TransferProof

Instructions

`verify_pubkey_validity`

`verify_withdraw`

`verify_zero_balance`

`verify_transfer`

State Account

ProofContext

Proof Freshness

Amount Bounds

Verification Flow

Error Codes